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NOTES
MIDI FILES: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER-GENERATED WORKS
Professor Lydian escorts you to Ins music composition class at
the prestigious university you are visiting. You expect a small
meeting room with a stereo and a chalkboard, but as you enter
the classroom your eyes reveal surprise that you desperately
attempt to hide from your colleague. He clearly has entered the
modern world while you are left composing on an outdated and
cumbersome tool. Your piano will never look the same again.
Students sit at twelve workstations in front of you. Each stu-
dent wears a set of headphones. Every station has a computer, a
keyboard, a drum machine, two sound generators (synthesizers
without keyboards), a digital reverb unit, an amplifier, and
wires, many wires. The wires run from the keyboard through a
little box to the computer and other components of the system.
The box has some writing on it: MIDI interface. Two cables
connect each station to the speakers in the front of the room.
The room is silent except for the light patter of keys striking
plastic casings. Some students appear to be virtuosos, with fin-
gers moving rapidly and skillfully over the keyboard. Others
hunt and peck at the keyboard with one finger. Can even they
compose? At least the familiar chalkboard is still in the front of
the room, separating the loud speakers.
Professor Lydian points out that many of the students do not
have a music theory background although some are theory ma-
jors. As the professor moves to the front of the class, the stu-
dents remove their headphones. Professor Lydian asks Aaron,
one of the virtuosos you had spotted, to play his piece. You hear
strings playing a beautiful melody remimscent of an old folk
tune. Woodwinds take over the melody while the strings supply
the underlying harmony The intonation is amazing, almost too
perfect. The room fills with a brass entrance and the timpam
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provides a slow rumble into the coda which ends the piece.
Where did he find the musicians to record his composition?
Professor Lydian has a second student play his composition.
Bob explains that he cannot read music but hopes his piece is
enjoyable. A heavy bass drum punctuated by a sharp high-hat
bursts from the speakers. Soon the pounding beat is joined by a
slap bass and syncopated rhythm guitar. Your foot develops a
mind of its own. A horn section accentuates the beat with preci-
sion pops. Funkadelic never sounded so good.
"Professor Lydian, not only were these compositions excellent,
but the musicianship was unparalleled. Where did you record
these compositions?"
"The sounds you heard were produced by synthesizers con-
trolled by information stored in a floppy disk on the computer.
The computer and synthesizers communicate by using the MIDI
language." Your short visit leaves you yearmng for a MIDI stu-
dio of your own and pondering the use of such a studio.
Musical Instrument Digital Interface, or MIDI, has had a
profound impact on the way music is created, heard, and related
to in our society At least one commentator regards MIDI as "the
most important composer's tool since the piano, because you
have an entire orchestra at your fingertips."' Students experi-
ment with composition at young ages and are able to compose by
ear with little instruction in music theory 2 MIDI is used not
only as a tool for composing, but also to teach harmony and
composition.'
Most important, however, a MIDI workstation can rival pro-
fessional recording studios.4 Multitrack recording, unlimited
instrumentation, and extensive error correction capabilities
permit a musician "of modest means, and limited talent, to
1. Henry Rich, CEM-ocracy, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 28, 1989, Electromag, at Ei5
(quoting Howard Massey, Executive Director of the Center for Electrical Music m
New York, N.Y.).
2. Thomas Rudolph, MIDI Goes to School, DOWN BEAT, June 1990, at 59 (noting
that in some schools 12- and 13-year-old students are writing original compositions).
3. Alexander Offers Unique College Method, Music TRADES, June 1991, at 105.
This author's first music composition class was conducted in a computer music lab
using MIDI workstations.
4. Alan di Perna, Digital Composing, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 15, 1990, at 167.
1136
achieve remarkable results."5 Using a sequencer program, a
musician can play a composition, "record" it, and then play it
back. The commercial music industry has recognized the value
of MIDI to such an extent that there is "hardly a record on the
pop charts that has not been shaped and refined through the use
of MIDI."6
MIDI is not limited to professional use. The availability to the
public of "[tlhis ability to fine-tune musical data has democra-
tized, if not revolutionized, music-making today "' The wide-
spread use of MIDI consequently presents a unique challenge to
copyright law because "while the mind strains to think of what
Beethoven or Mozart would have made of all of this, one thing is
for sure: there will be more music made by more people than
ever before,"8 and it will all be stored in a MIDI file on comput-
er disk.
"Above all else, technology now dictates the content of copy-
right laws and plots its course into the future."9 More than any
event in recent history, MIDI "has changed the face of the music
industry 10 A MIDI file stores data that direct synthesizers to
produce sound. When synthesizers execute these directions, a
musical composition results. The use of MIDI files, however,
raises complex questions: whether the files fall within the sub-
ject matter of the Copyright Act of 1976," and if so, what scope
of protection copyright law extends to materials subsisting in a
MIDI file.
This Note first provides a detailed description of MIDI and
focuses on whether a copyright in a computer program protects
the original work of authorship the program is designed to gen-
erate. In determimng whether a MIDI file is within the subject
5. Events That Shaped the Decade: MIDI & the Microprocessors Technologi-
cal Revolution, Music TRADES, Jan. 1990, at 113; see also di Perna, supra note 4, at
167 ("Even the most ham-fisted player can attain perfection after the fact.").
6. James Wyman, It's MIDI Time and Music Will Never Be the Same, VILLAGE
VOICE, Mar. 28, 1989, Electromag, at E14.
7. Id. at E15.
8. Id. at E16.
9. David Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A.
J. 42, 42 (1982).
10. NORMAN WEINBERG, THE LAST MIDI BOOK 1 (1988).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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matter of the Copyright Act of 1976, this Note provides a brief
history of copyright protection and proceeds to examine the
legislative history of sections 101 and 102 of the Act. After con-
cluding that a MIDI file is copyrightable as a computer program,
this Note examines a split between the federal circuit courts of
appeals involving the scope of copyright protection for video
games and audiovisual works generated by computer programs.
This Note concludes that, in general, a copyright in a computer
program does not protect an original work of authorship gener-
ated by a computer program, but that a copyright on a MIDI file
protects the underlying musical composition. Finally, this Note
suggests that Congress amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to
include computer-generated original works of authorship.
WHAT Is MIDI?
Industry Protocol
MIDI, or Musical Instrument Digital Interface, is an industry
protocol governing how electronic instruments commumcate with
each other." Communication occurs in the form of a serial com-
puter language 3 carried between computers and synthesizers
by cables. 4 Understanding the nature of the data commumcat-
ed by MIDI requires a short description of how synthesizers
work.
Synthesizers house a microprocessor that contains information
required to make a sound."5 Pressing down on one of the keys
in a keyboard creates an electrical impulse of certain voltage."
That voltage causes the microprocessor to instruct sound-gener-
ating equipment to play a certain pitch." The microprocessor
does not differentiate between voltages from different orgins; as
12. CRAIG ANDERTON, MIDI FOR MUSICIANS 1 (1986). For an excellent description
of MIDI, see Wyman, supra note 6, at E14-E15.
13. Seral computer languages send instructions in sequence, one after another.
Wyman, supra note 6, at E14-Ei5.
14. Id. at Ei4; see also WEINBERG, supra note 10, at 4 (describing the MIDI lan-
guage).
15. WEINBERG, supra note 10, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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long as the correct voltage is received, the desired pitch will
sound."8 These electronic Impulses can be encoded digitally
through a digital-to-analog converter. 9
MIDI is the computer language that equates digital signals
with electronic signals from musical instruments. ° The music
industry created MIDI so that every synthesizer company's mi-
croprocessor would respond to instructions written in MIDI.2
These instructions include pitch, pitch bend, velocity of the key,
patch number (indicating the particular sound or instrument),
and any number of specialized effects contained in the synthe-
sizer.22 Although MIDI instructions eventually cause a synthe-
sizer to generate sound, MIDI does not instruct synthesizers to
reproduce a specific sound.23 A MIDI file is not an audio record-
ing. One music reporter described the MIDI file as follows: "The
gestures made on a keyboard are translated into the serial com-
puter language that is MIDI, sent out of the MIDI Out port, are
received at the MIDI In port of a second (and third, and fourth,
ad infinitum) instrument, and that instrument faithfully repro-
duces those gestures."24
All computer languages function this way The language inter-
prets the instructions entered by a human being so that a micro-
processor will perform the needed result.25 MIDI is thus similar
to other computer languages in that it provides a formalized
method for the composer or programmer to instruct the micro-
processor to perform certain actions. MIDI differs from tradition-
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. Id.
20. See Wyman, supra note 6, at El5; see also WEINBERG, supra note 10, at 4.
The language is written in binary code divided into bytes. Id. Each byte has a spe-
cific meaning and instructs the microprocessor which function to perform. In the
computer world, a language written in binary code is called object code. Id.
21. WEINBERG, supra note 10, at 3. The instruction to play the note Middle C is a
good example. All notes on a keyboard have been numbered from zero to 127. Note
60 on the keyboard is Middle C. In binary code note 60 is written as 0011 1100.
When the computer receives this binary code, Middle C sounds regardless of the
instrument to which the code is directed.
22. Edie Herrold, MIDI: The Basics, HOT WIRE, May 1989, at 10, 11.
23. Wyman, supra note 6, at E15.
24. Id. The MIDI protocol also includes a segment that permits the composer to
select which instrument will sound Middle C.
25. See id.
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al computer languages in that the program is created by playing
an instrument.2 6 That program can find expression in many
different ways, depending upon how the synthesizer has been
programmed to respond to the instructions.
MIDI Files
A MIDI file is created by using a sequencing program. A se-
quencer makes 'MIDI especially useful because it is similar to
having a multitrack recording studio on a computer." The se-
quencer "records" digital data, which can then be "played
back. '29 Because MIDI data is recorded on a computer, the com-
poser can display it on the screen and mampulate the data,
much as a writer manipulates written text with a word proces-
sor. ° Each track can be recorded or overdubbed in perfect syn-
chronization. The composer can transpose sequences in pitch,
velocity, or duration, shift them in time, or invert sequences
after recording.' A composer can edit note by note, rearrange
passages using cut and paste functions, and easily fix any mis-
takes that occurred while recording. 2 The particular patch
(sound) also can be changed, either entirely or by just one pa-
rameter, such as "decay ""
The ability to create a MIDI file therefore presents many
advantages for a composer. The composition is immediately
realizable without acoustic instruments. The composer easily
can change key and tempo, and effortlessly experiment with
tone color. In addition, because sequences are called up and
reiterated easily, the composer can explore the formal dimen-
sions of music. The composer can restructure an entire work
26. Id.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24. Although patch number may be in-
dicated, the correlation between patch number and the sound produced may be var-
ied at the synthesizer itself.
28. Jon Balleras, An Introduction to MIDI Arranging and Orchestration, DOWN
BEAT, Aug. 1990, at 56-57.
29. Playing back causes a synthesizer to sound the notes that were just recorded.
30. Balleras, supra note 28, at 56-57; Wyman, supra note 6, at E15.
31. Balleras, supra note 28, at 56.
32. Id.
33. Wyman, supra note 6, at E15. Decay indicates how quickly a note will stop
sounding, or fade out.
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with little difficulty In all of these cases the data being mampu-
lated is a set of ordered instructions written in the MIDI lan-
guage.
A MIDI file is in essence a computer program stored in object
code that can instruct synthesizers to reproduce a musical com-
position. Principles govermng the ability to copyright computer
programs have developed out of the Copyright Act, its legislative
history, and judicial decisions. Some of these principles are set-
tled law, but others have split the courts and leave in question
the extent of copyright protection available to a MIDI file.
HISTORY OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Specific Enumeration of Copyrightable Works
The Constitution grants Congress the "Power To promote
the Progress of Science by securing for limited Times to
Authors the exclusive Rights to their Writings )34
The most significant limitation in the Copyright Clause is that
only works qualifying as "writings" may claim protection of fed-
eral copyright legislation. 5
Initially, Congress specifically enumerated which works quali-
fied as writings. The first Congress protected "any map, chart,
book or books already printed."6 Congress expanded the
protectable subject matter of copyright during the nineteenth
century by adding designs, prints, etchings and engravings,
musical compositions, photographs and the negatives thereof,
and "statuary [and] models or designs intended to be
perfected as works of the fine arts."a In 1908, the congressional
effort to extend copyright protection to improvements in technol-
ogy hit a roadblock. In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co.,3" the Supreme Court determined that the piano roll
used in a player piano was not a copy of the musical composi-
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. 1 MELVILLE B. NImmER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[A]
(1992).
36. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § i, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
37. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
38. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
1994] 1141DMDI FILES
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1135
tion.39 In declimng to extend copyright protection to piano rolls,
the Court held that the form in which a work is fixed must be
intelligible to human beings to warrant such protection," and
further that an interchangeable part of a machine is not a
copy 4 In other words, no copyright existed in mechamcal re-
productions of musical works.
General Description of Subject Matter
Works Intelligible to Human Beings
Congress abandoned its attempt to list copyrightable works in
1909 and provided instead a generalized description of copy-
rightable subject matter. Copyright protection under the Act
may be obtained for all "writings" of an author." The Copyright
Act of 1909 entitled the author to a copyright protecting the
composition embodied in mechanical reproductions, but not with
respect to the mechanical reproductions themselves.4 Such re-
productions included piano rolls, records, and tapes." Congress
extended copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971,"'
thereby overruling part of White-Smith by making interchange-
able parts of a machine copyrightable. The sound recording
copyright was limited to the actual sounds recorded (the specific
expression) and not the underlying musical work.4" For a copy-
right to subsist in the musical work itself, the work still had to
be intelligible to human beings.47
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076
(repealed 1976).
43. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 567-68 (1973).
44. See id., see also Ernest S. Meyers, Sound Recordings and the New Copyright
Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 573, 573-76 (1977) (providing the historical develop-
ments leading to the Sound Recording Act of 1971).
45. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (repealed 1976).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Works Not Intelligible to Human Beings
The Court in Goldstein v. California4 recognized Congress'
constitutional authority to redefine "writings" to include works
not intelligible to human beings.49 Goldstein concerned a chal-
lenge to a California statute that made record pirating a crime,
on the grounds that the Copyright Act preempted the subject
matter of the state criminal statute.0 In upholding the statute,
the Court held that Congress could have acted in the area, but
had refrained from doing so.5 Congress has the discretion to
determine what constitutes a "writing" for the purpose of protec-
tion under the federal copyright law 52 The congressional deter-
mination concerning what constitutes a "writing" "is dependent,
not only on the character of the writing, but also on the commer-
cial importance of the product to the national economy " Con-
gress, therefore, has the authority to redefine "writings" to in-
clude sound recordings and other works not intelligible to hu-
man beings.
The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976"4 finally overruled White-Smith by
providing that a writing need not be intelligible to human beings
to be eligible for copyright protection. A work is within the sub-
ject matter of the Copyright Act if it is an "original work[] of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression from
which [the work] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
48. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
49. See id. at 561-62.
50. See id. at 548-52.
51. Id. at 571.
52. Id. at 562.
53. Id., see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.08[A], at 1-44.33 (noting
that the broad construction given to "writings" in Goldstein is consistent with Judge
Learned Hand's statement in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1921). As Nimmer states, " 'Writings' must be given a content sufficient to
encompass the artistic and technological developments of a contemporary society." Id.
54. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-804 (1988)).
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device.""5 Section 102 indicates that works of authorship in-
clude musical works 5 and sound recordings."
A MIDI file must satisfy the requirements of section 102 to be
within the subject matter of the Copyright Act." A MIDI file,
therefore, must meet the fixation requirement in order to be
copyrightable. Section 102 describes this requirement as follows:
"A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority
of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a peri-
od of more than transitory duration."" To fit this definition, a
MIDI file must be the embodiment of a work in a "copy" or
"phonorecord." Because a MIDI file is not a "material object[] in
which sounds are fixed )"s it is not a phonorecord.6 ' A
MIDI file, therefore, must be a "fixed" "copy" of some work, 2 in
order to be copyrightable.
The work copied by a MIDI file may be characterized in any of
three ways, each resulting in different legal consequences. First,
the set of instructions stored in object code could be a work in
and of itself.6 3 Second, the set of instructions could be consid-
ered a copy of the musical work.' Lastly, the MIDI file could
be a copy of the musical work, and the musical work could also
be a copy of the MIDI file. 5 The three possibilities describe fine
distinctions in the nature of the copyrightable work, but these
distinctions will prove significant in determining the scope of
copyright protection granted to a MIDI file. An analysis of copy-
right protection for a MIDI file is best understood by limiting
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
56. Id. § 102(a)(2).
57. Id. § 102(a)(7).
58. For the purposes of this Note, a MIDI file and the musical work it generates
are assumed to be "original works of authorship," id. § 102(a), in order to elimnate
questions of infringement.
59. Id. § 101.
60. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
63. See infra notes 66-92 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text.
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the MIDI file to its most discreet characterization as instruc-
tions stored in object code, or a computer program.
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Computer programs written in source code and object code are
copyrightable.6 6 Courts consistently have held that the lan-
guage and history of the Copyright Act of 1976 indicate congres-
sional intent to overrule White-Smzth and to extend copyright
protection to computer programs. 7 The analysis is relatively
straightforward. An "original work[] of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression"" is copyrightable subject mat-
ter.
The Copyright Act enumerates seven such categories of works
of authorship, including "literary works" defined as "works, oth-
er than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, discs, or cards, in which
they are embodied." 9 Legislative history states that computer
programs were considered copyrightable under this definition. 0
In addition, Congress appointed a Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses (CONTU) to study computer uses of copyrighted
works7' and enacted a temporary provision, section 117, in the
1976 Copyright Act concerning such computer uses pending the
commission's report and recommendations."
66. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.04[C].
67. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a computer program, whether in object or source code,
is protected under the Copyright Act), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Wil-
liams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding
that the duplication of a computer program on a silicon chip was a "copy" of the
program under the Copyright Act); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-
56 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F Supp. 741, 750-51
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (extending copyright protection to video games).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
69. Id. § 101.
70. See H.R. REP. No. -1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (" 'literary works' mcludeH computer programs").
71. Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5731 (stat-
ing that § 117 applied only to the scope of protection accorded to copyrighted works
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The CONTU Report
CONTU recommended that Congress explicitly provide that
computer programs are the proper subject matter of copy-
right."8 To this end, CONTU suggested two changes. First, Con-
gress should replace section 117 with a section limiting exclusive
rights in computer programs to ensure that rightful possessors
of copies of computer programs may use or adapt these copies
for their use.14 Second, CONTU recommended adding a defim-
tion of computer programs to section 101."
Congress adopted the two suggestions in 1980,6 defimng a
computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about
a certain result."" The statutory language indicates that a com-
puter program is copyrightable even though it is used "directly"
in a computer, as object code is. In addition, the majority posi-
tion in the CONTU report, from which Congress adopted the
definition, was that object code is a proper subject matter of
copyright.78 Section 102 has always included works which can
be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commuliicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of machine or device." 9 Sections 101 and
102 and the accompanying legislative history indicate that com-
puter programs, whether in object or source code, are works of
authorship.8 0
when used in conjunction with a computer and not to the copyrightability of comput-
er programs themselves).
73. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] ("[Clomputer programs, to the
extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of
copyright.").
74. Id. at 12-14.
75. Id.
76. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988)) ("[lit is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program [when necessary to] the utilization of the computer
program or for archival purposes only.").
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
78. CONTU REPORT, supra note 73, at 21. The minority position argued that the
machine control phase is not directed at a human audience and is therefore not an
original work of authorship. Id.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
80. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d
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Fixatin
The determination that a computer program is copyrightable
subject matter leaves a final requirement of the Copyright Act to
be fulfilled. The computer program must be embodied in a
"copy "81 The Act defines "copies" as "material objects, other
than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise commumcated, either directly
or with the aid of machine or device."s2
Computer programs are perceived with the aid of a computer,
which leaves the question of whether the computer program is
"fixed." The Act describes a "fixed" work as one found in a "tan-
gible medium of expression" and whose "embodiment in a
copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commumcated for a period of
more than transitory duration."' A program, therefore, is
"fixed" when stored in the memory devices of the computer.'
Copyrighting a MIDI File as a Computer Program
Based on the above discussion, a MIDI file is copyrightable as
a computer program because it consists of a set of instructions
used directly by a computer (the synthesizer) to play a musical
work.8" Unlike a word processor's files, which store text, musi-
cal notation is not stored. Rather, a MIDI file instructs synthe-
sizers to execute specific gestures in a particular sequence. The
copyright owner is entitled to the exclusive rights enumerated in
section 106 of the Copyright Act."6 Infringement of the copy-
Cir. 1983) ("[Slource code instructions must be translated into object code before the
computer can act upon them, only instructions expressed in object code can be used
'directly' by the computer."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
81. Id., see also supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
83. Id.
84. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249 (holding that object code embedded in
ROM is "fixed"); see also M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 441 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that audiovisuals are "fixed" in the computer program or "memo-
ry device"); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that a video game's audiovisual display is "fixed" in ROM).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 66-84.
86. Section 106 reads as follows:
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right occurs when the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, as
defined in sections 106 through 118 are violated." As a result,
whenever an unauthorized copy or phonorecord is produced, an
infringement has occurred.88 Thus, the "copyrighted work"89 is
protected from copying. In the case of computer programs in
general and the MIDI file in particular, the copyrighted work is
difficult to discern. The text of the computer program is copy-
rightable as discussed above, but that program, the MIDI file,
generates a musical work that also is copyrightable if properly
fixed." The potential for two copyrightable works presents the
dilemma of whether a copyright on the MIDI file protects the
musical composition from being copied or whether the musical
composition must be copyrighted separately Phrased in accor-
dance with the Copyright Act, the issue is whether the MIDI file
is a "copy" of the musical work.
Courts have struggled with a similar question regarding au-
diovisual displays created by computer programs for both video
games and user interfaces. The early cases asked whether a
copyright on the audiovisual display protected the computer
program.9 Later the question became whether a copyright on
the computer program protected the audiovisual display 92 An
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distrib-
ute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptur-
al works, including individual images of a motion picture or other audio-
visual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
87. Id. § 501(a).
88. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 8.02[C].
89. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
90. Id. § 102(a)(2); see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. This Note
has assumed that the musical composition is an original work of authorship under
this section of the Act.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 105-24.
92. See tnfra text accompanying notes 154-74.
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exannnation of the audiovisual display, or video game, cases will
provide much insight into the protection afforded a MIDI file. In
both instances the problem reduces to whether a copyright on a
computer program protects the original work of authorship gen-
erated by the program.
THE VIDEO GAME CASES
Video Games "Fixed" in ROM
The plaintiff in Midway Manufacturng Co. v. Artzc Interna-
tzonal, Inc."3 registered its copyrights on two video games as
audiovisual works, but not as computer programs. 4 In the en-
suing action Midway sought a preliminary injunction barring
Artic from distributing a video game called Puckman and a
speed-up kit for the video game Galaman."5 Midway claimed
copyright protection "only in the series of images and sounds
appearing on the screen on the Galaxian and the Pac-Man
games."96 Artic contended that the video games were not "fixed"
as required by section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. 7 The con-
tention was that symbols or patterns contained in the ROMs
were combined by the microprocessor in various ways to create
the images seen on the screen. Artic, therefore, argued that the
computer was generating new unfixed images at all times."
The court determined that the audiovisual display could be
"'reproduced with the aid of a machine or device' over
and over again, for extended periods of time,"99 and was "re-
93. 547 F Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. dented,
464 U.S. 823 (1983).
94. Id. at 1006.
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or
devices such as projectors, viewers, or electromc equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Section 102(a)(6) provides that audiovisual works are consid-
ered works of authorship for purposes of the Copyright Act. Id. § 102(a)(6).
95. Midway, 547 F Supp. at 1001-05.
96. Id. at 1006.
97. Id. at 1007.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1007-08 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)).
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corded in the ROMs."' Copyright protected the original artis-
tic expression displayed on the screen of Midway's games, even
though the underlying computer program had not been copy-
nghted.'0' The court found that specific images, namely the
Pac-man figures and ghost figures, were stored in ROM and
combined by the microprocessor to form the completed image on
the computer screen.'
In actuality, the ROM stored a computer program capable of
generating the images displayed on the game screen.' Tis
factual misperception weakens the court's conclusion because
the court believed that the elements of the display were recorded
on the ROM and merely assembled into different formations by
the microprocessor. The ROM itself stores no images, only in-
structions on how to generate them. °4 The link between the
audiovisual display and the ROM is more tenuous than the
court believed. The court's reasoning, however, is applicable
even to a computer program. The video game could be repro-
duced over and over with the aid of a computer regardless of
whether the images were stored in the ROM or not.
Video Games Protected Without Copyright on Underlying
Computer Program
The court in Midway Manufactunng Co. v. Dirkschneider°5
did not suffer from the misperception noted above. Rather, it
held that audiovisual works are fixed in printed circuit boards
because they are tangible objects from which the audiovisual
works can be perceived for a time period that is more than tran-
sitory 06 This case, however, presented a challenge not voiced
100. Id. at 1008.
101. Id. at 1009.
102. Id. at 1007; see also supra text accompanying note 85. Regarding the text
accompanying supra note 98, "symbols" and "patterns" are unlikely terms to be used
in reference to a computer program, but such an interpretation is possible. See Mid-
way, 547 F Supp. at 1007 ("Artic notes that the ROMs in the video games do not
contain enough memory to store the entire picture that appears on the game's
screen at any one instant.").
103. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1982).
104. Id.
105. 543 F Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
106. Id. at 480.
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in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc."7
The defendants in Dirkschneider contended that the suit was
brought not to prevent infringement of the plaintiffs audiovisual
works, but rather to protect the computer programs contained in
the circuit boards."' The defendants argued, "[s]ince the com-
puter programs are not the subject of a copyright registra-
tion the plaintiff [Midway] cannot bring the action."0 9
The court held that a failure to obtain copyright registrations on
the computer programs underlying audiovisual works did not
preclude a suit for infringement of the audiovisual works be-
cause a computer program is a fixed copy of the audiovisual
work.10
Computer Program a "Copy" of the Video Game
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artzc Internatonal, Inc."' pro-
vides the clearest analysis of why a video game is protected
under an audiovisual display copyright. Williams sued Artic for
infringement of its copyright on its "Defender" video game be-
cause Artic was selling circuit boards containing a computer
program that generated a game identical to Williams' De-
fender."' Artic contended that Defender was not "fixed," and
therefore not protected by copyright."' The court stated that a
computer program is a fixed copy of the audiovisual work be-
cause
"[tihe [video game's] display satisfies the statutory definition
of an original 'audiovisual work,' and the memory devzces of
the game satisfy the statutory requirement of a 'copy' in which
the work is 'fixed.' The audiovisual work is permanently
embodied in a material object, the memory devices, from
107. 547 F Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983).
108, See Dirkschnezder, 543 F Supp. at 481.
109. Id.
110. See id. (citing Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F Supp. 635, 638-39
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982)).
111. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
112. See td. at 871-73.
113. Id. at 873.
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which it can be perceived with the aid of the other compo-
nents of the game.""4
Copying the Underlying Computer Program
M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews... presented a
new question regarding the scope of protection afforded by the
audiovisual copyright on a video game." 6 In Kramer, the plain-
tiff claimed that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copy-
right in a video game, "High-Lo Double Up Joker Poker," by
copying not only the audiovisual aspects of the game, but also
the underlying computer program." 7 The plaintiff asked the
court to determine whether a copyright on the audiovisual dis-
play protected the computer program from being copied. Citing
Williams and Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman.. approving-
ly, the court held that a computer program was a copy of the
plaintiffs audiovisual work even though it could be copyrighted
separately19 Because section 106(1) of the Copyright Act
grants the copyrght holder the exclusive right to reproduce
copies or derivative works, a copyright in an audiovisual display
generated by a computer program protects both the audiovisual
display itself and the underlying computer program to the extent
the game's expression is embodied in the program. 20
The computer program or "memory device" is the form in
which the audiovisuals are "permanently embodied" and are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression "capable of being"
reproduced or otherwise communicated, "either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." The "memory device," or
computer program, is an essential element of the audiovisual
copyright, satisfying the "fixation" requirement for the issu-
ance of a copyright and, as a "copy," within the statutory
114. Id. at 874 (alteration in originial) (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufinan, 669
F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also supra text accompanying notes 76-85.
115. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
116. See id. at 441-42.
117. Id. at 425.
118. 523 F Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
119. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441-42.
120. Id. at 442.
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definition, it is specifically protected from infringement under
the audiovisual copyright.'21
A computer program thus was protected by the copyright on an
audiovisual display generated by the program.
Kramer raises a number of additional questions due to its
unique factual setting. Kramer, who had obtained the audiovisu-
al copyright on the video game, was sued for infringement by
another company holding a copyright on the underlying comput-
er program. The parties to that litigation settled and assigned
the right to sue Andrews to Kramer.'22 Through settlement,
the parties had avoided the question of the scope of protection
granted by a copyright on a computer program that generates an
original audiovisual work. The court in Kramer held that a com-
puter program is a copy of the audiovisual work, but did not de-
cide whether the audiovisual work is a copy of the computer
program. Copies are the "material objects in which a work is
fixed."" A copyright on a computer program presents a unique
problem because a copyright of the computer program subsists
in the "set of statements or instructions used directly or
indirectly in a computer."" These instructions generate a
work, but whether that work is a copy of the set of instructions
has perplexed the courts.
THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION GRANTED TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Protecting the Nonliteral Aspects of a Computer Program
The federal courts of appeals first examined the scope of pro-
tection granted by a copyright in a computer program in Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.125 Jaslow
Dental Laboratory ("Jaslow Lab") hired Strohl Systems Group
("Strohl") to design and install a computer system that would
perform bookkeeping and admimstrative functions." Elaine
121. Id. at 441.
122. Id. at 429.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
124. Id.
125. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
126. Id. at 1225.
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Whelan, a part owner of Strohl, wrote a computer program
called Dentalab for Jaslow Lab."' Ms. Whelan then formed
Whelan Associates, which acquired Strohl's interest in the pro-
gram.'28 Two and one-half years later, Jaslow Lab developed a
computer program called Dentcom PC that performed largely
the same functions as Dentalab, but was written in a different
language so that smaller dental firms could use it on their com-
puters.'29 The district court ruled that the Dentcom program
infringed the Dentalab program "because its structure and over-
all organization were substantially similar;"' 0 even though the
Dentcom program did not copy Dentalab's source or object code
because it was written in a different language.'
The appeal addressed the sole issue of whether a copyright
protection on a computer program covers "the structure of the
program or only the program's literal elements, i.e., its source
and object codes."'32 The court of appeals first stated that com-
puter programs are copyrighted as "literary works"'3 and that
copyright infringement of other literary works is possible even
without a finding that the literal elements of the works bear a
substantial similarity ".. For example, the copyright on a play
or book is violated by copying its plot or plot devices. '35 By
analogy, infringement of the copyrights of computer programs
can occur even without copying of the literal elements of the
program. 36
127. Id. at 1225-26.
128. Id. at 1226.
129. Id. Dentalab was written in a computer language known as EDL so that it
would work with IBM Series One computers. Dentcom PC was written in the BASIC
language because many smaller dental firms did not use IBM Series One computers.
Id.
130. Id. at 1228-29. The court found the programs to be similar in three respects:
the file structures and screen outputs were virtually identical and, five important
subroutines were performed almost identically. Id. at 1242-45.
131. Id. at 1233.
132. Id. at 1234.
133. Id., see supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text (discussing the copyright
protection afforded to computer programs).
134. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1234.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The court then derived a rule for distinguishing idea from
expression in the computer program context:'37 "[Tihe purpose
or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea and
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function
would be part of the expression of the idea."3 ' If a variety of
means are available for achieving the desired purpose, then the
specific means chosen is not necessary to the purpose. 9 The
chosen means, then, is expression and not idea. 40 The rule
was intended to advance the basic rationale underlying the
idea/expression distinction: the balance between competition and
protection.
[A]mong the more significant costs in computer programming
are those attributable to developing the structure and logic of
the program. The rule proposed here, which allows copyright
protection beyond the literal computer code, would provide
the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their
most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold
over the development of new computer devices that accom-
plish the same end.'
Because a number of nomnfrnging programs that incorporated
many of the same ideas and functions were available for the
business management of dental laboratories, the court concluded
that the structure of the Dentalab program was not the idea, but
rather, part of the expression of the program. The court ex-
plained its conclusion by stating that "[tihe 'expression of the
idea' in a software computer program is the manner in which
the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in
receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and
137. Id. at 1235. The defendants argued that the structure of a computer program
was, by definition, the idea underlying the computer program and not expression of
the idea. Id., see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form m
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
138. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1236 (emphasis omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1237.
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 1238-39.
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producing useful information either on a screen, printout or by
audio communication."'"
Whelan Associates is important because it is the first circuit
court case to deal with the scope of protection afforded by a
copyright on a computer program. The court extended copyright
protection beyond the literal code of the computer program to
the "structure, sequence, and orgamzation" of that code. 45 The
passages in which the court stated that screen outputs gener-
ated by computer programs cannot be direct evidence of copy-
right infringement of computer programs emphasized the limited
nature of the holding.148 Screen displays have "some probative
value" 47 because of their relation to the underlying program,
but are not direct evidence of infringement.1' The holding did
not extend protection beyond elements contained in the written
program code,141 or "set of statements or instructions."'50
Screen Displays as Nonliteral Aspects of a Computer Program
Once copyright protection was afforded to nonliteral aspects of
a computer program, the next logical question was whether the
same copyright protected the screen display generated by a copy-
righted computer program. Courts generally have dealt with this
issue in cases involving similar user interfaces generated by
different computer programs. 5' The courts have split in their
determination, some holding that user interfaces are protected
144. Id. at 1239 (quoting Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F
Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). The court found additional support for tis con-
clusion in 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988), which extends copyright protection to compilations
and derivative works. The definitions of these terms indicated "that Congress was
aware of the fact that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyright-
ed, i.e., that the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea,
of a work." Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1239.
145. Id. at 1248.
146. See id. at 1244 (discussing the different treatment accorded screen outputs and
computer programs under the copyright law).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1248 (including the computer program's structure, sequence, and orgam-
zation).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining "computer program" for purposes of the Copy-
right Act).
151. See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text.
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by a copyright on a computer program,152 others holding user
interfaces beyond the scope of copyright protection on a com-
puter program."' An examination of these cases will provide
the basis for deterimmng the scope of copyright protection af-
forded to a computer program.
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.'54 placed
the issue of whether user interfaces were protected by a copy-
right on the computer program squarely before the court.'55
The plaintiff, Broderbund Software ('Broderbund"), held the
exclusive licenses, and plaintiff, Pixellite Software ("Pixellite"),
held the exclusive copyright on a computer program called "The
Print Shop."'56 The defendant, Umson World ("Umson"), sold a
computer program called "The Pnntmaster."'57 Both pieces of
software were menu-driven programs designed to enable users
"to create customized greeting cards, signs, banners, and post-
ers."'58 Broderbund claimed that "the overall appearance,
structure, and sequence of the audiovisual displays in
'Printmaster' infringe[d] plaintiffs' copyright on 'Print
Shop.' ))159
The court first determined that the "Print Shop" user inter-
faces were copyrightable expression distinguishable from the
idea underlying the menu screens, input formats, and sequenc-
ing of screens, which are not copyrightable.6 ° It then proceed-
152. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989).
153. See, e.g., Digital Commumcations Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659
F Supp. 449, 455-56 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
154. 648 F Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
155. Id. at 1130.
156. Id. at 1129-30.
157. Id. at 1130.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1132-33; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). An examination of this
determination is beyond the scope of this Note. Because all copyrghtable works
must pass the idea/expression test, this Note is concerned only with the question of
whether a computer generated work is protected by a copyright on the underlying
computer program, assuming the generated work is copyrightable expression.
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ed to compare two decisions involving alleged copyright in-
fringement of computer programs: Synercom Technology v. Uni-
versity Computing Co. 6' and Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.'62
The court in Synercom Technology held that the idea underly-
ing input formats, which are a type of screen display, and the
expression of that idea were indistinguishable.'63 The input
formats therefore were not copyrightable expression."M The
court in Broderbund Software rejected this position and held
that copyright protection of a computer program extended to its
audiovisual displays.'65 The court based its holding on an in-
terpretation of Whelan Associates that viewed the case as stand-
ing for "the proposition that copyright protection is not limited
to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather that it
extends to the overall structure of a program, including its au-
diovisual displays.""' Not only is this interpretation of Whelan
Associates erroneous, the court in Broderbund Software also
confused fundamentally different legal questions and made an
illegitimate comparison of cases.
Synercom Technology addressed the question whether a par-
ticular audiovisual display (input formats) was copyrightable
expression separable from the idea underlying the formats."'
Whether the holding was correct, this issue is not discussed in
Whelan Associates. Instead, Whelan Associates addressed the
question whether the copyright of a computer program protected
just the source and object codes or if instead protection extended
to the structure and orgamzation of the copyrighted pro-
gram.16 The right in Whelan Associates relates to the nonliter-
161. 462 F Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
162. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
163. See Synercom Technology, 462 F Supp. at 1013-14.
164. Id. at 1014.
165. Broderbund Software, 648 F Supp. at 1133.
166. Id.
167. Synercom Technology, 462 F Supp. at 1013. The court in Broderbund Software
should have used this case in the first step of its analysis.
168. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text. A. determination of whether
the overall organization of a computer program was idea or expression was required
in Whelan Associates, as in all copyright cases, but the court was looking at the
structure of the text, not the audiovisual display. The display was only used as
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al elements of the computer program itself. Those nonliteral ele-
ments do not necessarily include the screen display
Support for this proposition is found in Computer Associates
International v. Altai, Inc.69 In that case, Computer Associates
sued Altai for infrnging the structure of its "Adapter" computer
program. 70 The Second Circuit concluded that nonliteral as-
pects of computer programs, such as the structure, fell within
the scope of copyright protection, but suggested that nonliteral
elements of computer programs did not include screen
displays. 7' The court stated:
We have no reservation in joining the company of those
courts that have already ascribed to this logic [that the
nonliteral aspects of a computer program are protected by
copyright].
[W]e note that our decision here does not control in-
fringement actions regarding categorically distinct works,
such as certain types of screen displays. These items repre-
sent products of computer programs, rather than the pro-
grams themselves, and fall under the copyright rubric of
audiovisual works.'72
The court's holding in Broderbund Software, therefore, is based
on a nisinterpretation of the Third Circuit's holding in Whelan
Associates and on confusion over the appropriate analysis. 7 '
Synercom Technology and Whelan Associates, however, did
examine the appropriate issues: whether a screen display is
copyrightable expression separable from an underlying idea, and
whether copyright protection on a computer program extends to
the audiovisual work generated by the program. Altai embodies
this two-step approach. The preliminary question requires appli-
cation of an established doctrine and depends on the specific
work and art being applied.74 The idea/expression determina-
evidence of similarity m the mfringement action.
169. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
170. Id. at 696-97.
171. Id. at 702-03.
172. Id.
173. See Digital Commumcations Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that Whelan Associates did not stand for the
proposition that a copyright on a computer program protects screen displays).
174. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879) (holding that where the work
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tion is necessary because the generated work may be insepara-
ble from the idea underlying that work.
Extending the scope of copyright protection of computer pro-
grams to generated works is based on the umque technology
used and an interpretation of the Copyright Act. Discerning how
far copyright protection of nonliteral elements of a computer
program extends is essential to determining whether a copyright
on a MIDI file protects the musical work generated. The musical
work, similar to a screen display or video game, is generated by
the MIDI file, or computer program. If copyright protection for
the computer program does not extend beyond the code stored in
a MIDI file, the musical work may not be protected. The follow-
ing cases present the two competing positions.
CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION GRANTED TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Protectin Limited to the "Set of Statements or Instructins"
The court in Digital Communicatons Associates v. Softklone
Distributing Corp.' held "that copyright protection of a com-
puter program does not extend to screen displays generated by
the program."' The court rejected the interpretation of
Whelan Associates used by the court in Broderbund Software for
the reasons discussed above' and then turned to an analysis
of M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews, ' holding that a
copyright on the audiovisual display of a video game protected
the underlying computer program from copying. 9 The basis
for this conclusion was that a computer program is a copy in
which the audiovisual screen display is fixed.80 However, a va-
riety of separate and independent computer programs can gener-
and the art are inseparable, the work is not copyrightable); see also 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1988) (disallowing copyright protection for, among other things, ideas, con-
cepts, and principles).
175. 659 F Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
176. Id. at 455.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
178. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
179. Softklone, 659 F Supp. at 456.
180. Id.
1160
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ate the same screen display The court thought it "illogical to
conclude that a screen can be a 'copy' of many different pro-
grams."18' The unusual nature of computers explains the ap-
parent anomaly created by holding that a computer program is a
"copy" of a screen display, but a screen display is not a copy of a
computer program.
The distinction between programs and screen displays lies in
the fact that if one has a fixed computer program, one can,
with the aid of a computer, repeatedly produce the same
screen display Thus, a computer program is a copy of a
screen display The converse, however, is not true. If one has
a fixed screen display, one cannot, even with the aid of a
machine, repeatedly create the same program (source or
object code) as many different programs can create the same
screen display.. 2
Screen displays generated by computer programs are not pro-
tected by a copyright on a computer program because they "are
not direct 'copies' or 'reproductions' of the literary or substantive
content of the computer programs." " The court's holding in
Softklone is consistent with those cases relying on a separate
audiovisual copyright to protect video games from copying."
Softklone draws a line between the computer program as a
literary work and the output generated by the program.'85 Two
distinct works exist, but due to the umque nature of computers,
the computer program can be a copy of the screen display even
though the screen display cannot be a copy of the computer pro-
gram.1
86
MIDI files resemble video games and screen displays in this
respect because two distinct works, the MIDI file and the musi-
cal composition, exist. The MIDI file, or computer program, is
the form in which the musical work is permanently embodied
and fixed in a tangible medium of expression capable of being
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 455.
184. Id., see supra text accompanying notes 91-124.
185. Softklone, 659 F Supp. at 454-55.
186. Id. at 456.
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reproduced with the aid of a computer and synthesizer. Under
the rationale outlined in Softklone, because a MIDI file creates
two separate works, the scope of copyright protection granted by
a copyright on a MIDI file depends on whether the musical com-
position is a copy of the MIDI file. Softklone's reasomng is per-
suasive if one accepts that the original work of authorship creat-
ed by the programmer is solely the text of the computer pro-
gram. A computer program and the output it generates, howev-
er, might be considered part of one single work.
Extending Protectin Beyond the Code
The Ninth Circuit implicitly characterized a computer pro-
gram and its output as one work in Johnson Controls v. Phoenix
Control Systems.*"7 The court held that the test of whether
copyright protected an element of a computer program depended
on whether the element qualified as the expression of an idea
rather than as the idea itself.8 ' The court based its holding on
the fact that computer programs consist of several different ele-
ments, including the source and object codes, the structure, the
sequence and organization of the program, the user interface,
and the purpose of the program.'89 Whether the nonliteral ele-
ments of the program are protected depends on the particular
facts of each case and on whether the element is an expression
or an idea.9 '
The IdealExpression Test for Protected Elements of Computer
Programs
Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Internatin-
al191 presents a detailed legal analysis supporting the
idea/expression test as the only limit on protecting nonliteral
elements of a computer program. 92 Beginmng with the general
187. 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 740 F Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing an action for infringement of the
Lotus 1-2-3 computer program).
192. Id. at 53-62.
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proposition that original, literal manifestations of a computer
program, the source and object code, were copyrightable as liter-
ary works,'93 the court proceeded to examine the Copyright Act
to determine whether Congress had intended to protect screen
displays by a copyright in the underlying computer program.
9 4
Computer programs, like all other works of authorship, are not
entitled to an unlimited scope of copyright.'95 The most rel-
evant limitation is contained in the Copyright Act: " 'In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, pnncqple, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.' ,,"96 The House Report declared that " 'Section 102(b) is
intended, among other things, to make clear that the expressin
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual process or methods em-
bodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright
law ' "197
Recognizing that the Copyright Act of 1976' did not ade-
quately address copyright protection for computer programs,
Congress appointed CONTU to study and compile data on the
use of copyrighted works in conjunction with computers and
other new technologes. 9 9 CONTU recognized the importance
of protecting computer programs,"0 but did not propose any
statutory changes with respect to the copyrightability of com-
193. Id. at 45.
194. Id. at 47-54. Much of the opinion m Lotus tracks legislative history that this
Note previously discussed m connection with the copyrightability of the literal as-
pects of a computer program, see supra notes 34-57 and accompanying text, but
reiteration is appropriate in order to understand the reasoning behind extending
copyright protection of computer programs to screen displays.
195. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 49.
196. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
197. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670).
198. Id. (citing H.R. REP NO. 1476, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5731).
199. Id. at 49-50 (citing Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(b)-(c), 88
Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (establishing the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works)).
200. Id. at 50 (citing CONTU REPORT, supra note 73, at 20-21).
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puter programs."' The Commission did recommend two
amendments with respect to permissible copying of computer
programs.2 The proposed amendments were then adopted by
Congress with little modification or additional legislative histo-
ry 203 The definition of a computer program was added to sec-
tion 101 of the Copyright Act, and section 117 was amended to
permit owners of a computer program to make additional copies
or adaptations of the program." 4 The CONTU Report also re-
emphasized the distinction between copyrightable expression
and noncopyightable methods, processes, and ideas.0 5
The court then noted that a copyright in a musical, dramatic,
or motion picture work or a work of literature may be infringed
by copying the nonliteral aspects of the work.0 6 A most telling
remark accompamed this observation: "This type of copying of
nonliteral expression, if sufficiently extensive, has never been
upheld as perrmssible copying; rather, it has always been viewed
as copying of elements of an expression of creative
originality "'07 In granting copyright monopolies, Congress
aimed to serve the public welfare by stimulating authors to
create and disclose new ideas to the public.!0  The
idea/expression limitation balances the competing goals of copy-
right protection.0 9
The Idea /Expresswn Limitation
In construing the Copyright Act, courts must avoid broademng
the scope of protection to an extent that would hamper develop-
ment of improved products. At the same time, courts must not
construe the scope too narrowly and thereby discourage the
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988))).
205. Id. (citing CONTU REPORT, supra note 73, at 37-46).
206. Id. at 51-52.
207. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 52-53.
209. Id. at 52-54.
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creation of all but modest incremental advances.21 ° Congress
did not provide a boundary line between the copyrightable and
noncopyrightable elements of a computer program.2 ' The
courts, therefore, must evaluate the statutory language while
remamng sensitive to the object and policy underlying copyright
law 212 "The interplay between sections 102(a) and 102(b), illu-
mined by the related legislative history, manifests that the stat-
ute extends copyright protection to expressive elements of com-
puter programs, but not to the ideas, processes, and methods
embodied in computer programs."213 The court, therefore, de-
termined that Congress intended to use the idea/expression
distinction as part of the test for copyrightable elements of a
computer program.2"4 Accordingly, the court in Lotus deter-
mined that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure was origi-
nal, nonobvious, and capable of being expressed in a virtually
unlimited number of ways.215 The user interface, therefore,
was protected as a nonliteral element of expression of the under-
lying computer program.2 6
Computer Program and User Interface as a Single Work of
Authorship
The Lotus opinion concluded with a discussion of a defense
presented by Paperback Software. Paperback argued that Lotus'
allegations of copyright infringement in the user interface of
Lotus 1-2-3 were really allegations of infringement in the
program's screen displays."' Because Lotus had not registered
the screen displays as separate audiovisual works, the court
lacked jurisdiction over the allegations of infringement in
them.218 Stating that the contention "border[ed] on the fivo-
210. Id. at 53.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing H.R. REP NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 57 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667, 5670).
214. Id. at 54.
215. Id. at 68.
216. Id. at 68, 80.
217. Id. at 79.
218. Id.
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1Ous, " 2i9 the court concluded that Lotus' registration certificates
extended protection to the screen displays.22 According to the
court, the defendants had failed to account for the statutory
language related to the copyrightability of nonliteral elements of
a computer program, including the user interface."' According
to the court, screen displays, viewed in a narrow sense, were not
copies of the "set of statements or instructions [used] to
bring about a certain result,"222 but the screen display was use-
less "unless it is integrated with other parts of the computer
program so as to become indirectly part of the means by which
the user communicates instructions through the total program to
bring about the desired result."223 Copyright protection extend-
ed to screen displays because the screen display was created and
used "as a part of the 'set of statements or instructions' in a pro-
gram that is designed 'to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result.' 224 The practice
of the Copyright Office buttressed the above conclusion. For the
purposes of registration, "all copyrightable expression owned by
the same claimant and embodied in a computer program, includ-
ing computer screen displays, is considered a single work."2"
Under Lotus and Johnson Controls, the idea/expression test is
the only limitation on the scope of copyright protection granted
to computer programs and, therefore, the only limitation on the
scope of copyright protection granted to MIDI files.
Computer Programs and the Generated Work as One Work of
Authorship
Although the court quickly dispensed with Paperback
Software's argument, the question posed above formed the basis
219. Id.
220. Id. at 80.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 80 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 81 (quoting Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Registration of Com-
puter Screen Displays, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988)). In addition, Lotus had tried to
register the screen displays separately but was denied registration because the dis-
plays were considered an integral part of the computer program. Id.
1166
of dispute in Broderbund Software, Softklone, Johnson Controls,
and Lotus. Before determining whether a screen display generat-
ed by a computer program is protected as copyrightable expres-
sion by a copyright subsisting in the underlying computer pro-
gram, the court must determine whether the screen display is
part of the computer program, or more precisely, whether a
work generated by a computer program is part of that program
under the Copyright Act.
The analysis in Lotus is persuasive-computer programs are
copyrightable as "literary works."22 By analogy, the nonliteral
aspects of structure, sequence, and organization of the code are
copyrightable. The scope of protection afforded the nonliteral
elements of computer programs is limited by the idea/expression
distinction codified in section 102(b) of the Act. Whether the
nonliteral elements of a program are protected depends on the
particular facts of each case. The screen display is copyrightable
because it is part of the programmer's expression,227 and be-
cause it is part of the integrated whole called a computer pro-
gram.22 8 The screen display, therefore, is a nonliteral element
of the computer program.229 By concluding that screen displays
are nonliteral elements of computer programs, the Lotus opinion
loses its force, but not for want of reasonable and compelling ar-
guments. Screen displays are zn fact part of the programmer's
expression and in the broad sense part of one work."39 Screen
displays are not, however, part of a "computer program" as de-
fined by the Copyright Act.2"'
"A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result."23 2 It receives copyright protection as a
"literary work" and by analogy its nonliteral aspects are also
copyrghtable. The copyrightable nonliteral aspects of a comput-
er program are the structure, sequence, and organization of the
226. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
227. See supra text accompanying note 197.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 207-16.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 217-24.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 210-16.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
232. Id.
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code itself. The structure, sequence, and orgamzation of the "set
of statements or instructions" are the protected aspects of the
programmer's expression. The "result" brought about by this "set
of statements or instructions" is not part of a computer program.
By providing a definition of a "computer program," Congress
limited the copyrightable elements of the work created by a
programmer.
Extending copyright protection of nonliteral elements of com-
puter programs to screen displays generated by computer pro-
grams based on legislative history and case law ignores two
important factors. First, the literary aspect of a computer pro-
gram is the code itself. The code is "expressed in words, num-
bers, or other verbal or numerical symbols""3 and therefore
satisfies the Copyright Act's definition of a "literary work." A
screen display does not satisfy this definition and is therefore
outside the scope of protection granted a "literary work." In-
stead, a screen display is a separate audiovisual work, not part
of the computer program.
Categorizing computer programs generally as "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" could
overcome this limitation."4 The protected work would be de-
fined broadly to include the result generated by the program and
would recognize the special nature of computer programs. Con-
gress, however, precluded this option in its choice of definition
for "computer programs." The existing statutory definition indi-
cates that "computer programs" are copyrightable as "literary
works" and that the results generated by computer programs are
not part of the nonliteral aspects of computer programs." 5 The
cases holding video game displays separately copyrightable also
support this conclusion." 6 Protection of MIDI files, therefore,
cannot be based on an extension of the scope of protection grant-
ed to nonliteral elements of a computer program. The scope of
protection granted by copyright on a MIDI file is limited to the
233. Id.
234. Id. § 102(a).
235. See, e.g., Digital Commumcations Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F
Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987); see also supra text accompanying note 160 (screen
displays are separately copyrightable as audiovisual works).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 93-124.
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literary aspects of the MIDI file's code and does not extend to
the musical work.
In addition to the above limitation, the video game cases ex-
plain why a screen is not a "copy" of a computer program, a
position that Lotus supports when applied to the narrow view of
a computer programY Most original works of authorship gen-
erated by computer programs will not be copies of the underly-
ing program because many programs can produce the same
result. Because a MIDI file is an industry-wide protocol, howev-
er, it may be a copy of the work generated. Generally, the scope
of copyright protection granted a computer program does not in-
clude the result generated by the program, and that result is not
a copy of the underlying program. MIDI files present a situation
in which a computer program is a copy of the result generated,
in this case a musical composition.
MIDI Files as Copzes of the Underlying Computer Program
MIDI files are nothing more than "computer programs" as
defined by the Act. They are a set of instructions used to control
synthesizers and to produce a musical work. By assumption, the
musical work generated by the MIDI file is an original work of
authorship, but it is not protected as an element of the computer
program itself. The musical work, however, is a "copy" of the
MIDI file. Anyone who hears a piece of music can reproduce the
MIDI file. MIDI is an industry protocol defining the language
used by electromc instruments to commumcate.238 Each byte of
binary code is a translation of a gesture made on the attached
musical instrument and indicates a special function or note."9
The MIDI file stores the instructions created by the gestures in
real time."4 As a result, the order in which a synthesizer exe-
cutes these instructions cannot be varied without changing the
musical work. Because MIDI is an industry protocol recorded in
237. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F Supp. 37, 80 (D. Mass.
1990) (citing Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455-66, for the proposition that it is illogical
to conclude that a screen can be a copy of many different programs).
238. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text
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real time, one set of instructions generates only one work and
when that work is played into the computer, the same MIDI file
is always created. The musical work dictates every aspect of the
program. A one-to-one relationship exists between the MIDI file
and musical work. This fact eliminates the anomaly described in
Softklone.241 Playing the musical work into a synthesizer and
utilizing a sequencing program repeatedly creates the same
MIDI file or computer program.242
In effect, by standardizing the way synthesizers commumcate
through the industry wide protocol, MIDI simply creates another
method of musical notation. That a sequencing program can
translate the MIDI file into a screen display indicating the notes
played, their order, duration, attack, fade, and patch number,
among other aspects, evidences MIDI's notational character.243
The musical work stored in a MIDI file is the equivalent of a
musical work written on a piece of paper in traditional staff
notation. The only difference between MIDI notation and staff
notation is that MIDI includes more information about the notes
and how they will be sounded. It is not a "sound recording" or a
"phonorecord" because no sounds are fixed, just instructions.2'
The anomaly that a computer program can be a copy of the
work generated, but the work generated is not a copy of the
underlying program, has been eliminated by the establishment
of an industry wide protocol. Because the musical work is a copy
of the instructions contained in a file, copyright protection of
MIDI files extends to the musical work generated by the instruc-
tions contained in the file.
Special circumstances make the original expression embodied
in a MIDI file protectable by a copyright on the underlying com-
puter program. While this outcome may not offend anyone's
sensibilities, it does bring the current Copyright Act's treatment
of computer programs into question. If protecfing MIDI files is
241. 659 F Supp. at 456 (holding that a computer program is considered a "copy"
of a screen display but a screen display is not considered a "copy" of a computer
program).
242. See id. (noting that a fixed screen display cannot repeatedly create the same
computer program, even with the aid of a machine).
243. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
244. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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acceptable, why are other forms of original expression generated
by computer programs not protected by copyrights on the un-
derlying program? The double limitation applied to computer
programs, separating the code and the result of a computer
program, and then applying the idea/expression test, does not
appear justified. The idea/expression test is the only limitation
applied to the copyright protection granted to all other original
works of authorship.24 Applying this test to works of author-
ship generated by a computer program is no more difficult than
applying the test to works viewed in isolation. The same consid-
erations arise in each case.
CONCLUSION
The Copyright Act protects "computer programs" as "literary
works." The scope of that protection is limited to the literal and
nonliteral aspects of the "set of statements or instructions" con-
tained in the program. "Original works of authorship" generated
by computer programs do not fall within the scope of copyright
protection granted a computer program and, in general, are not
"copies" of the "computer program." The existence of an indus-
try-wide protocol that records instructions designed to control a
computer in real time creates a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the work generated by a "computer program" and the
program itself. The "computer program" and the work it gener-
ates become "copies" of each other. Copyright protection on a
MIDI file should extend to the musical work generated by the
file because the musical work is a "copy" of the MIDI file.
The practical inseparability of computer programs and their
output or result, combined with the computer's potential as a
creative tool, indicate that Congress should amend the Copy-
right Act to include a separate category of work that protects
any original expression embodied in or generated by a "computer
program."
Congress can extend copyright protection to original expres-
sion generated by computer programs without requiring a sec-
245. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547
(1985).
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ond copyright. One original work of authorship encompassing
the literary aspects of the program as well as the result generat-
ed by the program would have to be recogmzed in order to elimi-
nate the division between the program code and the result gen-
erated by the code. The Copyright Clause, as interpreted in
Goldstein v. California,24 grants Congress discretion in de-
termining whether such a work deserves protection; that deter-
mination depends not only on the character of the writing, but
also on the writing's commercial importance."  Computers
present a problem because one act of creation results in two
separately identifiable works: the program itself and the result
generated by the program.
The desirability of protecting computer programs was recog-
nized in the CONTU Report:
The cost of developing computer programs is far greater than
the cost of their duplication. Consequently, computer pro-
grams are likely to be disseminated only if [tihe cre-
ator may spread its costs over multiple copies of the work
with some form of protection against unauthorized duplica-
tion of the work The Commission is, therefore, satisfied
that some form of protection is necessary to encourage the
creation and broad distribution of computer programs in a
competitive market. The commission's conclusion is that the
continued availability of copyright protection for computer
programs is desirable.'
The works generated by computer programs are too numerous
and vaned to be listed, but the Copyright Act indicates that
"original works of authorship" are protected.249 Examples de-
scribed above include musical compositions250 and audiovisual
displays.251 Congress, therefore, has determined that both the
computer program and the result it generates deserve copyright
protection if original. 2 Limiting the scope of copyright protec-
246. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
248. CONTU REPORT, supra note 73, at 11.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
250. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
252. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988).
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thon to the "set of statements or instructions"253 creates an eas-
ily identifiable line with little justification.
The creative energy involved in making a MIDI file is entirely
directed at conceptualizing the musical work. Having created the
musical work, the composer simply inputs the work into the
computer. The gestures are stored in sequence, and the comput-
er program necessary to replay the musical work is complete.
The effort required to encode the musical work is mimmal to
nonexistent from the composer's point of view In addition, the
MIDI file's value is based solely on the quality of the musical
work.
Video games may be viewed in a similar fashion. "The popu-
larity of a video game depends on the creativity of its audiovisu-
al display, not on the form of its computer program."254 While
the percentage of creative energy required to produce the, pro-
gram underlying a video game is significantly greater than that
required to create a MIDI file, the aim and value of the program
is determined by the audiovisual display
More utilitarian programs, such as Lotus 1-2-3255 or
Dentalab, 6 present a slight variation because the conception
of the computer program becomes more important. The bulk of
the expense and difficulty in creating these programs is attribut-
able to the development of the logic, structure, and sequence of
the program." Also, creating a suitable user interface for
these programs is more difficult and requires greater creativity
than merely encoding the user interface design. In these cas-
es, the relative values of the creative work that ultimately pro-
duces the computer programs is unclear. Conceptualizing the
screen display is likely to be a small part of the overall structure
of the program. The value of programs like Lotus 1-2-3 and
253. Id. § 101.
254. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd,
669 F.2d (2d Cir. 1982).
255. See supra notes 191-225 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
257. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
258. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intfl, 740 F Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass.
1990).
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Dentalab, however, still rests on their ability to commumcate
results to the user. The results in these cases are, respectively,
calculations on a spreadsheet and general record keeping.
Ultimately, all computer programs are designed to commum-
cate a useful result to the user."9 Communication of this result
necessarily takes the form of a computer-generated work that is
not part of the underlying computer program. The generation of
this work is why consumers buy the computer program in the
first instance; the form of the underlying code is unimportant.
The value of a computer program, therefore, is based on the
ability of the program to communicate its results to the user
effectively Divesting the set of instructions from the result ren-
ders a computer program valueless. A computer program is an
integrated whole that includes the "set of statements or instruc-
tions" and the work designed to communicate the program's
results to the user.60
Copyright law strives "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."261 Copyright monopolies serve an as in-
centive for authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to
the public.262 The public welfare, therefore, is advanced by us-
ing personal gain to encourage individual effort.263 Extending
the scope of copyright protection afforded a computer program
will increase the incentive to disclose original works of author-
ship while maintaining the limitations imposed by the
idea/expression test. The computer is an extremely useful cre-
ative tool that provides individuals with an opportunity for ex-
pression unparalleled in recent history Computer control of
video images and music permits a person with access to a com-
puter to become an artist. MIDI is a great example. With a
multitrack recording studio available at their fingertips, individ-
uals working in small studios can become viable composers.
259. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing
the fact that although computer code is used ultimately in a process, this fact
should not affect the copyrightability of computer programs as expression).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 210-18.
261. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Stewart,
J.).
262. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
263. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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Protecting works generated by computer programs increases the
available pool of authors by providing affordable means for indi-
viduals to generate works that once could be produced only in
specialized and expensive studios. In turn, the number and di-
versity of works created will increase.
Christos P Badavas
